In the midst of the escalation of the crisis between Russia and what it calls the West (USA, NATO and the EU) over Ukraine, Moscow insinuated that it could be among its plans to deploy military forces in Latin America and more specifically in countries like Cuba, Venezuela and Nicaragua. "I don't want to confirm anything... I don't rule it out," said Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov. This veiled threat to send troops (or even something else) forces us to reflect on the role of Latin America in the Kremlin's strategy.
💥Political and economic panorama in Latin America in February 2022
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These
statements can be seen as a way of setting limits to Washington, a clear
message about the need for mutual respect and non-interference in their respective
areas of influence. If the US insists on advancing in the former Soviet
republics, Russia will increase its presence in the "American
backyard". The Russian government, in full tension with the US and the EU,
announced in January that it would strengthen strategic cooperation with Cuba,
Venezuela and Nicaragua in "all areas". Foreign Minister Sergei
Lavrov revealed that Vladimir Putin, during recent talks with the leaders of
those three countries, agreed to strengthen bilateral ties. With them "we
have very close relations and strategic cooperation in all areas: in the
economy, culture, education and military-technical cooperation."
This
rivalry between Russia and the US in geographical areas close to each of them
is a dynamic with common ingredients: both have chosen the strategy of
"resilience support". Since the end of the Cold War, Washington has
articulated its relationship with the countries of the post-Soviet space,
supporting their sovereignty and independence from Russia. For its part, Moscow
has tried to preserve and increase its influence among the historical allies of
the USSR (Cuba and Nicaragua), becoming a fundamental supporter at the expense
of the US for the regime of Nicolás Maduro in Venezuela and Daniel Ortega in
Nicaragua.
While the
Biden Administration did not believe that Russia possessed sufficient military
capability (National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan called it a “bluff”), there
is both historical and recent precedent to support such threats. In 2008,
during the Georgian conflict, Moscow sent Tu-160 nuclear-capable bombers to
Venezuela for the first time, as well as four warships, including the nuclear
cruiser “Peter the Great.” In 2013 and 2018 these movements were repeated and
on that last date the Russian government declared its intention to establish an
air base on the Venezuelan island of La Orchila.
In this
increasingly globalized and interconnected world, nothing that happens at the
other end of the planet is unrelated. Even more so if one of the actors
involved, Russia in this case, threatens to deploy troops in Cuba and
Venezuela, along with other "technical-military measures." According
to Russian tradition, these measures could range from deploying military
technicians and specialists, as in Venezuela, to betting on new hybrid wars
-including cyber-attacks-, even installing nuclear missiles in Cuba, Venezuela
and eventually Nicaragua, as in Kaliningrad and other border areas. The 1962
missile crisis showed that this is not an unreasonable threat. As a consequence
of this, the Treaty of Tlatelolco was signed in 1967, which allowed Latin
America to become a denuclearized zone. It is not Moscow's only nuclear option:
another possibility, with less financial costs than deploying nuclear missiles,
would be to deploy its Zirkon hypersonic missiles on submarines sailing close
to the US coast.
The
possibility of a deployment of nuclear missiles in Latin American territory
would put an end to more than half a century of regional consensus around the
need to stay away from atomic weapons. If the 1962 Cuban crisis showed
anything, it was that when two powers negotiate to avoid going to war, the
temporary allies – stone guests like Castro's Cuba – have no say in the final
agreement. Castro's discomfort was enormous when he learned that the USSR had
agreed behind his back to remove the missiles from the island in exchange for the
US doing the same in Turkey.
Even if
this nuclear threat does not materialize, the governments of the region should
intervene and have a voice in the current international situation for more
immediate issues, such as the rise in energy prices which, except for the
producing countries, entail greater spending for the families and even force
governments to make greater fiscal spending via subsidies. However, a
coordinated regional response is currently unfeasible. Not only because there is
no precedent in this regard, but also because it is made impossible by the
existing fragmentation and heterogeneity as well as by the very varied
positions shown in the face of the crisis and the preferences in relation to
the actors involved.
Old powers and
emerging powers: China, Russia, Iran, India and Turkey on the Latin American
chessboard
Latin
America plays a secondary role on the international board. And while she is not
totally oblivious to the Ukrainian crisis, her role is equal to her peripheral
position. This is due, first of all, to the paralysis of the integration
process, which has led the region to have a limited presence on the
international scene and not to express itself with a single voice in
multilateral forums. Do not forget that most countries, with rare exceptions
(Brazil, Chile and Mexico), lack a solid and coherent foreign policy. These
generally focus on the regional relationship, especially with its neighbors.
The international presence of Latin America has usually been in tow of the
great powers. This was accentuated in the years of the Cold War, between the
1950s and 1980s. Then, the struggle between the US and the USSR took place in
Latin America (Guatemala in 1954, Cuba from 1959, South America in the 1960s
and Latin Central in the 1980s) an outstanding scenario, although it was just
one more in the clash between capitalism and communism.
His role on
that world stage responded to historical continuity and to the relationship
with the various international centers of power. However, since the 1990s,
especially after the 2008 crisis and the repeated signs of weakness in the US
presence, various extra-regional powers have become visible in Latin America in
search of greater prominence, in some cases to challenge the US hegemony. This
process was facilitated by the anti-imperialist and post-colonial policies of
the ALBA countries and their allies.
The
consolidation of a multipolar world, especially after the 2008 crisis, had
multiple consequences for Latin America. From an economic point of view,
markets were diversified, allowing China to consolidate its role as a relevant
trading partner, a process that began in the 21st century. Geopolitically,
certain emerging international actors have found a way to gain influence,
economic power, prestige and allies at the expense of the traditional powers:
the US, the EU and Spain. This progressive loss of presence, influence and
reputation has allowed the appearance of new powers (China) or the reappearance
of others (Russia).
This is how
China and Russia landed in Latin America from the first decade of the 21st
century, and more particularly in the last decade, but also Iran and, to a
lesser degree, Turkey. India, also present, has its own less marked agenda for
now, but with a greater capacity for expansion in the medium term. Almost all
question US hegemony and bet on a multipolar world, trying to displace it from
the region economically, technologically, militarily and commercially. China
has a well-established strategy since the time of Hu Jintao, when he drafted
the first White Paper on his regional policy. The Latin American projection has
been enhanced by Xi Jinping, with a quantitative and qualitative leap in the
presence of Beijing, which has become the second largest trading partner in the
region and the first in some countries.
Turkey, a
country with few ties to Latin America, has opted to expand its economic and
commercial projection, as well as its political one. President ErdoÄŸan, in full
authoritarian drift, is looking for allies to compensate for his international
isolation. The government of El Salvador, also at odds with the US, has staged
an approach to Ankara seeking support for its project to establish bitcoin as
the official currency. The Turks follow the path of Iran, which since the 1990s
has been very present in the region (commercially and politically, including
unexplained links with certain terrorist attacks). In this way he became one of
the main international allies of Venezuela, both with Hugo Chávez and Nicolás Maduro.
In January of this year, the foreign ministers of Nicaragua and Iran, Denis
Moncada and Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, held a telematic meeting to deepen relations
between the two countries.
Iran, whose
shadow has hovered over the 1994 attack against the Argentine Israelite Mutual
Association (AMIA), found in Latin America a propitious scenario to break its
international isolation. Especially thanks to its entente with regimes like
that of Venezuela, with Chávez or Nicaragua with Ortega. Venezuela signed more
than 270 agreements with Iran and when Chávez died, President Ahmadinejad
called him a “messiah”. Quite a paradox since this alliance, forged in the
first decade of the 21st century, supposed a rapprochement between the
ultraconservative regime of the ayatollahs and other "Bolivarian
socialists." This geopolitical alliance is sustained by the rejection of
US hegemony and oil. The Iranian regime also has fluid relations with Bolivia,
based on common anti-imperialist sentiment.
What is
Vladimir Putin looking for? Keys and methods of the international strategy of
post-Soviet Russia
Unlike
China, Russia has a Latin American policy linked to the personalistic and
authoritarian leadership of Putin. Since he came to power (1999) and especially
since the last decade, one of his goals is to restore Russia as a global power,
a condition lost after the collapse of the USSR. Putin's route to regaining
status has gone beyond his immediate geographical area – the former Soviet
republics – seeking again the strategic areas. In this context, the Latin
American countries burst in, although Putin's strategy, without the ideological
conditioning of yesteryear, is more pragmatic to diversify its foreign
relations and has its roots in the "Primakov Doctrine" (for which he
was Prime Minister and Foreign Minister between 1996 and 1999). Primakov was
highly critical of Boris Yeltsin's idea of "leaving" the regions
where Russia had exerted great influence during the Cold War, including Latin
America, in order to move closer to the West. Primakov's ideas underlie Putin's
"assertive strategy" in Syria, his rapprochement with China and his
support for Maduro and Ortega.
Russian influence in Latin America has special characteristics compared to China. First, because of its historical precedents. Russia, in certain aspects, is heir to the USSR, whose presence in the region grew during the Cold War, especially after the Cuban Revolution. But, the current behavior is different, more in the forms than in the background, as there is a thread of continuity. Although the ideological factor (communism) has disappeared, others remain, such as the geopolitical struggle with the US and the Soviet desire – once the czars and now Russia – to be a power with world influence.
Moscow uses
Latin America to counter US influence in other areas. If Washington intends to
gain a presence in areas of Russian influence –such as Ukraine– it will
increase its military presence in the Caribbean. For Putin, the region is one
more piece in his global strategy. Russia, as a revisionist power, questions
the existence of a "unipolar world" led by the US with the support of
the EU. These, together with NATO, are the main obstacles to rebuilding Russian
influence in its hinterland (Georgia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan) and becoming a regional
and world power again.
This leads
Russia to seek foreign partners to build different alliances: geopolitical, to
counterbalance US hegemony, or economic-commercial to counteract the
consequences of the sanctions imposed by Washington and Brussels after the
crises in Georgia (2008) and Ukraine (2014 and 2022). ).
Latin
America is important to Russia on three basic issues: (1) its alliances with
Venezuela, Cuba, and Nicaragua can be useful in undermining US hegemony; (2)
this allows Putin to present himself as a global actor, not just a local one,
turning Latin America into a platform to create a new multipolar order – in
2008 Nicaragua was the first Latin American country to diplomatically recognize
South Ossetia and Abkhazia after separating from Georgia–; (3) Latin America is
a deterrent to the US and its claims to advance on the Russian hinterland. As
the Ukrainian crisis has shown, the confrontation that Washington raises in
vital areas for Russia, such as Ukraine, is answered with displays of force or
threats to do so in Latin America as well.
From its pragmatic position and away from ideologies, Russia tries to expand its presence in Latin America and establish itself through different tools: trade, energy or the sale of weapons. At first, trying to take advantage of the Bolivarian regional integration initiatives, such as ALBA, it sought alliances that would counterbalance the US. In 2014, Putin sent a message to the ALBA summit, noting his desire to broaden the relationship and expand "our dialogue and practical interaction on both bilateral and multilateral bases." However, he suffered the same disappointment as Bush in 2005, when he verified with the FTAA that the regional division, the lack of leadership and the inconsistency in regional integration prevented reaching global agreements with the region. Similarly, the paralysis of ALBA, orphaned by Chavez's leadership and bereft of Venezuelan petrodollars, exposed its limitations.
However,
Russia maintains strong ties with CELAC, as it agrees on the geopolitical
objective of building a multipolar and multilateral world. This closeness has
been reflected in the signing of a Permanent Mechanism for Political Dialogue
and Cooperation (2015). For Russia, the relationship with CELAC is a way of
inserting itself, gaining weight and global visibility through an international
organization outside its theoretical area of influence. For CELAC (a forum
that excludes the US and was created with the aim of being an alternative to
the OAS), the link with Russia makes it gain autonomy from Washington.
In any
case, in the last five years, Putin has privileged bilateral relations.
Maintain a strategic link with governments clearly opposed to the US, such as
Cuba, Nicaragua, Venezuela, Bolivia and Kirchnerist Argentina. Also with those
capable of counteracting Washington's hegemony: Brazil and Mexico. It is a
relationship of mutual convenience, especially with the Cuban dictatorship and
the Venezuelan and Nicaraguan authoritarian regimes. Moscow is not interested
in the violations of Human Rights in Cuba, the attacks on the opposition in
Venezuela or the dictatorial drift in Nicaragua (with whom it collaborates in
military and intelligence matters). These countries position themselves
alongside Russia when it opposes the US, as in the Ukraine crisis, and the alignment
of Nicaragua and Venezuela with Russia and vice versa in international forums
is automatic.
Russia has
been a strong support from the governments of Ortega and Chavez. In 2018, after
the crackdown on students in Managua, she urged the US at the United Nations to
"abandon attempts inspired by the colonialist tradition to influence the
situation in Nicaragua." In 2021 the Human Rights Council of the UN
adopted a resolution condemning the repression against Nicaragua and asking
Ortega to allow peaceful demonstrations against him. The resolution was adopted
with 20 votes in favor, 18 abstentions and eight against, including Venezuela,
Cuba, Bolivia, Russia and China. In 2019 a proposal for Washington in the
Security Council to demand free presidential elections and the entry of
humanitarian aid to Venezuela was vetoed by Russia and China. In 2020, Russia
denounced the Security Council US actions against Venezuela, which he
considered "provocations" and "threats" contrary to UN
standards. Meanwhile, those close to Putin Latin American countries have shown
their support repeatedly since 2008. That year, after the second war with
Georgia, Russia was the first country to recognize the independence of Ossetia
South and Abkhazia, something who made very few, like Nauru, Nicaragua and
Venezuela. In 2014 a UN resolution declared invalid the referendum in Crimea,
with 100 votes in favor, 58 abstentions and 11 votes against, including
Bolivia, Cuba and Nicaragua. In the current crisis in Ukraine, Venezuela and
Nicaragua have given repeated public displays of position with Russia.
His
strongest link in Latin America with Venezuela. The process began with Chavez
and Maduro continues. Russia went from being a non-existent player in 2000 to
become one of the largest investors through the military and hydrocarbon
sectors. He has sold more than 17,000 weapons million and the state company
Rosneft has signed several strategic agreements with PDVSA Oil and Gas.
In full
boom of the Bolivarian regime (2004-2012), he modernized Chavez Bolivarian
National Armed Force (fanbase) buying Russian weapons. Venezuela became the
largest buyer of weapons in Latin America and went from 46th to 15th in the
world ranking of buyers of military equipment. 76% of exports of arms and
military services of Russia to Latin America was to Venezuela.
While trade
relations outside the military category are scarce in recent years it has
multiplied. Russia has bolstered Maduro, despite having less purchasing power
than Chavez. Russian military presence basically compose technical support
personnel Russian equipment that operates FANB. Also special forces units and
military contractors to train the Venezuelan military and police personnel. In
2020, eight Russian specialists drones helped the Bolivarian forces in
Operation Shark, to stop the invasion of rebel soldiers who attempted to land
on the Venezuelan coast.
At the same with Cuba, during the Ukrainian crisis Putin spoke by telephone with Maduro. According to Tass, "Putin expressed his unwavering support for the efforts of the Venezuelan authorities to strengthen the sovereignty and ensure social and economic development of the country" while Caracas highlighted the existence of exchanges at the highest level "issues concerning cooperation existing in various strategic areas ". Maduro also he rejected provocation and manipulation campaigns against Russia.
Russia has
regained the fluid relationship with Cuba that had the USSR during the Cold
War, and the alliance with Fidel Castro in 1960. Amid the Ukrainian crisis,
Putin Miguel Diaz-Canel and presidents pledged to deepen "strategic
cooperation" and strengthen bilateral relations. They agreed to intensify
their contacts to expand "cooperation in trade, economy and
investment." Days before, had come to Havana 20 tons of medical aid, the
fifth shipment of this type since 31 December: 80 tons in less than a month
against 200 you tons in 2021. The Russian strategy reinforces what is making
the Kremlin for a decade and it was shaped in 2014 with the Russian Cuban debt
forgiveness (30,000 million dollars) since Soviet times and the possibility of
reopening the Lourdes electronic station.
Until the recognition of the People's Republic of China by Managua, Russia was Nicaragua's main extra-regional ally, apart from Taiwan. Moscow's support was evident after Ortega's last re-election, when he consummated his dictatorial drift amid generalized regional isolation and confrontation with the White House. Putin offered Moscow's "unwavering support" to Nicaraguan efforts "to guarantee national sovereignty" and expressed his "willingness to continue supporting [its] social and economic development." It was the latest chapter in the alliance between two authoritarian regimes. Ortega, reluctant to travel abroad, visited Russia in 2008 and Putin included Managua in his 2014 Latin American tour. Russia has financed Nicaraguan military and intelligence modernization. This has made it possible, since 2016, to create military training centers and acquire battle tanks within the framework of a "military-technical cooperation" agreement and anti-aircraft defense systems. The correlate of it is Ortega's support for Putin in the previous and current crisis in Ukraine and his position contrary to the Western sanctions against Moscow. Since 2018, when Ortega crushed the protests against him, he had Russian support. In 2019, Putin sent a letter to his “dear friend, brother” and assured that Nicaragua could always count on his help. In 2021, Russia was one of the few countries that recognized his re-election after the massive arrest of the main opposition figures, including several presidential candidates.
Russia also has a strong presence in other countries, such as Argentina, Brazil and Bolivia. In the midst of the escalation of tension with the US and NATO, Argentine President Alberto Fernández visited Moscow and in mid-February the Brazilian Jair Bolsonaro did so. The link with Argentina, resumed in 2010, ranges from geopolitics, as Fernández's trip in January 2022 showed, to the economy, given the interest of Gazprom and other companies in Argentine gas. Fernández's visit came after the debt renegotiation agreement with the IMF – in which the US played an important role. Fernández offered to turn Argentina into the "gateway" for Russia in Latin America and saw Putin as a counterweight to the US: "I am determined that Argentina has to stop having such a great dependence on the Fund and The US has to make its way to other places and Russia has a very important place there”.
Russia's
main economic and geopolitical partner in Latin America is Brazil. He was with
Lula and continues to be with Bolsonaro. This shows that Putin's pragmatism is
above ideological criteria. Since 2010, Brazil has remained Russia's main
economic partner in Latin America, with 33% of the regional total. During
Lula's presidency, Brazil and Russia, together with China, India and South
Africa, formed the BRICs bloc, which to date has held 12 summits, the last two
in Brazil (2019) and Russia (2020). With Bolsonaro the relationship has not
declined. In addition to common international interests, they share a similar
vision of politics: both promote illiberal and authoritarian governments. In
the midst of the Ukrainian crisis, the South American president announced his
visit to Russia, which according to the newspaper Folha de São Paulo did not
have the approval of Washington. For Bolsonaro, the trip to Moscow is a way of
showing his autonomy in foreign policy: “Brazil is Brazil, Russia is Russia. I
have a good relationship with everyone. If [Joe] Biden invited me, I would also
gladly go to the US.”
The Kremlin has maintained and fostered closeness with Evo Morales in Bolivia, whom he supported when he was overthrown in 2019. After the return to power of the MAS in 2020, ties have become even closer with exploitation projects in strategic areas, such as gas and lithium. Last October, Bolivian Foreign Minister Rogelio Mayta visited Moscow, where Foreign Minister Lavrov ratified that Bolivia is one of Russia's priority partners in Latin America. The geopolitical link is joined by economic interests. Gazprom, already active in the Incahuasi gas field, will participate in the tender for the exploitation of lithium. Rosatom (Russian state atomic consortium) is building a nuclear research center in El Alto.
This Russian presence in the region has had another derivative due to the tense relations between Venezuela, the main client of Russian weapons in Latin America, and Colombia, an ally of Washington and a NATO partner since 2017. In full escalation between Russia and Ukraine , the Colombian Minister of Defense, Diego Molano, denounced a prolonged “foreign interference” –Russian– on the border. What underlies this issue is not only Colombia's fear of the Russian presence on its border and its cooperation with the FANB, but also the ultimate fate of Russian weapons. These could well end up in the hands of Colombian criminal gangs and guerrillas operating from Venezuelan bases, with the acquiescence of the Chavista regime. The weakness and corruption of the Venezuelan State and the financial capacity of these gangs led Bogotá to launch such a complaint, while Colombia accused the Maduro government of supporting Colombian armed groups. The tension led to a meeting between the Colombian Foreign Minister, Marta LucÃa RamÃrez, and the Kremlin representative in Bogotá, Nikolay Tavdumadze, where Russia promised to prevent the diversion of its military cooperation. Likewise, Moscow guaranteed that its assistance to Venezuela is technical and not military.
The
deployment of soft power
Russia, despite not being a relevant economic and commercial actor in Latin America, has increased its projection and prestige through other strategies, such as “vaccine diplomacy” or information/disinformation campaigns. In the case of vaccines, Russia gained prestige for having developed Sputnik V, effective against COVID-19, and for having made it available to Latin American countries at a time when the EU and the US monopolized the purchase of vials. Despite logistical problems that delayed its arrival and not being recognized by the WHO, Sputnik V was applied in Argentina, Bolivia, Honduras, Guatemala, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay and Venezuela.
During his recent visit to Moscow, Fernández said he was "deeply grateful" for the supply of vaccines "at a time when they were scarce" and stressed that Russia is "a highly valued country" for the support it gave the continent at the beginning of the pandemic. Argentina, which has started producing it in 2021, is sending them to Ecuador, Peru and Paraguay. For his part, Putin recalled that Argentina was "the first country in the Western Hemisphere" to register this vaccine, to which he added the first contract for its supply.
In the realm of soft power, Russia also seeks to gain a foothold in Latin America, as in other parts of the world, through propaganda. Russia Today (RT) in Spanish and expansion on the Internet (Sputnik) are the Kremlin's most ambitious mechanism to gain image and influence. Thus, RT in Spanish has Latin Americanized its contents, to try to capture the interest of the regional public. His bet has been successful, by gaining new followers, which has given him a new platform to attack the US and the EU, which he shows as corrupt countries that do not respect human rights and protect war crimes. RT presents a friendly face of Russia while showing it as an efficient and successful alternative political model compared to the “decadent” western democracies.
Conclusions
The role that some Latin American countries have played in the Ukraine crisis has once again highlighted one of its recurrent problems: witnessing, sometimes even sharing, lawsuits that it considers foreign and over which it does not exercise any type of control or influence. This Latin American role is not new, it was played by Cuba in the missile crisis in 1962 and Nicaragua in the 1980s, and it is repeated periodically. The ultimate cause is the weakness and division of its States and the absence of a regional governance system capable of preventing external interventions, aggression or interference. That is why there is no one to transfer the unified voice of the region to multilateral bodies and there is no specific weight or capacity to influence world governance. Latin American disinterest in global problems is deeply rooted in the regional idiosyncrasy. Their governments and public opinion only care about those issues that directly affect them and turn their backs on others, especially those that have nothing to do with them, such as Islamic terrorism. For most Latin American countries, foreign policy is no more than a policy of regional relations, especially with border nations.
This
intrinsic Latin American weakness opened the doors to the interventionism of
old powers (USA) and is what now allows emerging actors, such as Russia, to use
their relationship with the countries of the region to turn them into pawns in
a larger game, where their interests are missing. In the Russian case, the
Latin American countries are a tool of the Kremlin to deteriorate the influence
of the US, while gaining allies in its global strategy.
Despite the
fact that Latin America is exposed in the midst of the escalation that the US,
NATO and Russia are experiencing due to the crisis in Ukraine, few warning
voices have been heard in the region in the face of the Russian threat to
deploy its powerful arsenal. Latin America is not directly threatened by the
Ukrainian crisis, but it should take a position on it. In the Russian-Latin
American link, Russia is the one that benefits the most. Although it is true
that Moscow has increased its purchases from Latin American countries (because
of the sanctions it has replaced the EU countries with those of MERCOSUR for
the purchase of fruits, vegetables and meat) and that the sale of arms
represents an important item of its exports, the Kremlin cares about Latin
America for various reasons. This also includes the geopolitical perspective,
linked to its conflict with the US, and the diplomatic perspective to diversify
relations and obtain support at the UN. Although the commercial relationship
has grown throughout the Putin period, almost 50%, it has done so from very low
levels: Russian imports from Latin America do not exceed 5% of total Russian
trade and in exports to the region, the average rate is around 2%.
This allows it to present itself as an actor with global interests and presence, with a project for a new international order backed by allies not only from its closest hinterland (Belarus) but also outside the Eurasian area (Latin American countries). In exchange for this geopolitical support, Russia supports dictatorial (Cuba and Nicaragua) or authoritarian (Venezuela) regimes that thus manage to break the international siege for their persistent violation of freedoms and human rights. Although Moscow deploys measures aimed at winning Latin American support through "vaccine diplomacy" or to boost its soft power, it can hardly balance the weight of the US or China as a market for Latin American products, as the statements of President Alberto Fernández would seem to give to understand when he spoke of turning Argentina into the "gateway for Russia in the region".
Countries
directly allied to Russia coexist in Latin America, such as Cuba, Venezuela and
Nicaragua, others with a less clear position, but with a certain proximity to
the Kremlin such as Peru, Argentina and even Brazil. And others that move in
silence (Mexico) or clearly allies of the US such as Chile, Uruguay and
Colombia. As long as this situation persists or other similar ones that may
arise in the future, the weight of the region in the world geopolitical
scenario will not only be small, its negotiating capacity reduced and its
secondary role reduced, but the countries will continue to play the game of the
others . In this way, if there is no integration process and as long as each
country "makes war on its own" there will be no possibility of
influencing international conflicts, not even those things that directly affect
them.
This analisys was made by
- Carlos Malamud
- Mira Milosevich-Juaristi
- Rogelio Nuñez Castellano
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